Recent evidence from the …eld (Hossian and List, 2009) suggests that contracts framed in terms of a loss (a deduction is taken for failing to meet a threshold) lead to greater e¤ort than contracts framed in terms of a gain (a bonus is given for meeting a threshold). We investigate two explanations for this framing e¤ect in a laboratory setting. First, we …nd that the loss frame communicates the expectation that achieving the bonus is the default and that our subjects comply to this expectation. Second, we …nd evidence for an endowment e¤ect, even though the bonus is just a monetary payment that subjects do not even have in their possession.
, Richard Thaler (1980) and others …rst described a variety of contract relevant behavioral anomalies, including endowment e¤ects and loss aversion. These anomalies, no doubt, extend beyond contracts, but given their immediate and practical applicability to contractual exchange, the delay is somewhat surprising. Practitioners struggle with these issues on a daily basis. Consider, for example, the contractual relationship between Oeresund A/S -a joint venture between the Swedish and Danish states, which was created to construct a "link" between Copenhagen, Denmark and Malmö, Sweden-and one of its contractors. Given the size of the bridge and the sometimes adverse weather conditions, the bridge required special cables and damper technology to keep vibrations below a given safe and sound threshold that exceeded the current state of art. The company offered its contractor an attractive price with a schedule of deductions to be implemented to the extent that the contractor failed to achieve the stipulated, and never-before-achieved threshold. Both the company and the contractor recognized that the likelihood of meeting the threshold was close to zero. Nonetheless, by exerting greater e¤ort, the contractor could reduce the deductions. Contracts, as the one used by Oeresund A/S, where breach is almost a certainty, are sometimes called a Cadillac contract because they call for the highest possible quality level. In hindsight, company o¢ cials questioned whether the Cadillac clause undermined the contractor's performance by its very terms, which the contractor reported as unfair. Company o¢ cials now suggest they should have instead o¤ered bonus payments for exceeding a less stringent and easier-to-reach threshold. In a fully rational framework, however, it should make no di¤erence whether a contractor gets a bonus payment for meeting an appropriately speci…ed benchmark or faces a deduction for failing to meet the benchmark as long her payo¤ is the same for any given level of achievement. The only di¤erence is framing.
With the former, the contractor is exposed to a gain frame, whereas with the latter, a loss frame is salient. Nonetheless, Oeresund's observation that its contractor felt unfairly treated under the contract suggests that the loss frame triggered distinct behavioral e¤ects.
1 It is not obvious, however, whether loss frames elicit lower or higher e¤ort than gain frames do.
1 Luft (1994) …nds a similar e¤ect in the lab.
Oeresund's contractor may indeed have been dissatis…ed with the Cadillac clause, but still work harder as a result of its loss frame.
Loss frames, as recently suggested by Hossain and List (2009) , can have positive e¤ects on e¤ort. Hossain and List studied in a …eld experiment how Chinese factory workers react to two contracts which only di¤er in their framing. The …rst is framed in terms of a gain.
Workers are told that in addition to a ‡at wage a bonus is given for meeting a threshold. The second is framed in terms of a loss. Workers are told that they get a ‡at wage and a bonus which is retracted if they fail to meet a threshold. In both cases, the total compensation is paid out at the end of the month. This setting is much simpler than the Oeresund A/S example described above. A company like Oeresund A/S deciding between o¤ering a "bonus" or a "Cadillac" contract not only chooses between using a loss and a gain frame but also depending on the type of contract that is used shifts the quality threshold. In fact, by shifting the quality threshold from the lowest to the highest quality level, parties continuously move from a pure bonus to a pure Cadillac contract. But both are cases are examples how framing is used in the …eld to increase the e¤ort of workers or contractors.
Our experimental design is similar to the approach taken by Hossain and List (2009) in their study of contracts o¤ered to Chinese factory workers. They employ a …eld experiment, which has the advantage of enhanced external validity; however, this advantage comes at the price of some loss of control and less ‡exibility in the design of tailored controls. In
Hossain and List's experiment, a number of variable environmental factors were present. In particular, workers in their study faced a stochastic relationship between e¤ort and output, which raises the possibility that the e¤ect they observed was due to loss aversion. Indeed, the presence of loss aversion is the main explanation the authors o¤er for the observed phenomenon. However, it is unclear of what kind this uncertainty was. For example, we do not know whether the workers and their employer had the same information and beliefs about the distribution of outcomes or if the information structure was asymmetric in the sense that one of the parties had superior knowledge. If such asymmetry was present in Hossain and List's setting, it raises the possibility that the contracts were understood as providing information to the less informed party. Finally, the authors do not …nd a signi…cant treatment e¤ect for e¤ort on the individual level if workers are exposed to the di¤erent contract frames but only for groups of workers. They speculate that a team might be in ‡uenced by the risk-attitude of the most loss averse group member. Along those lines, Landeo and Spier (forthcoming) point out that coordination e¤ects may play a big role in teams as well. In their …eld setting, Hossain and List are not able to disentangle those potential driving factors.
Making use of the advantage of control in the lab, we design a parsimonious and transparent experiment to disentangle the impact of framing. We o¤er individual lab subjects one of two contracts that di¤er only in their framing in order to rule out any team e¤ects, such as coordination. As in Hossain and List, the …rst is framed in terms of a gain (a bonus is given for meeting a threshold), while the second is framed in terms of a loss (a deduction is taken for failing to meet a threshold). Subjects work with a technology possessing a deterministic relationship between e¤ort and output, eliminating uncertainty. The information provided to subjects about the underlying production function is symmetric, eliminating the possibility of information leakage.
In line with Hossain and List (2009) , we hypothesize that individual subjects select e¤ort levels greater than the payo¤-maximizing choice. In particular, we expect (H1a) that more subjects choose a bonus in the loss frame than in the gain frame. 2 Moreover, we hypothesize (H1b) that subjects exert higher e¤ort in the loss frame than in the gain frame.
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Our main interest, however is to identify the mechanism behind the selection of greater e¤ort levels in the loss frame. We hypothesize (H2) that the loss frame may communicate a stronger sense of the default expectations of the contractual partner. That is, framing may be a subtle way of communicating the expectations of the party o¤ering the contract. As the gain frame may appear to be a "reward" while the loss frame seems like a "punishment", 2 When we say that subjects "choose a bonus" we mean that they choose to rent a machine that garantees them a bonus. In other words, they choose to produce an output level which earns them a bonus under the gain frame and prevents them from loosing the bonus under the loss frame.
3 H1b is related to H1a but not identical. The number of subjects choosing a bonus might not di¤er between treatments. Still, more subjects in the loss frame than in the gain frame may choose e¤ort levels beyond the minimum e¤ort level that would garantee them a bonus. it may be that the subject thinks that expectations to meet the threshold are higher under the loss frame than under the gain frame. After all, a reward is often viewed as a kind of recognition for voluntary overperformance, while a punishment is more akin to a sanction for not meeting the client's expectation.
In an additional treatment, we directly manipulate this communication e¤ect of framing.
We try to disentangle two channels, through which the e¤ect may unfold. The …rst is motivational. As described above, the subject may think that the loss frame indicates that the party o¤ering the contract has a higher expectation in her. She wants to please this expectation and therefore invests more e¤ort to meet it. In order to test for this motivational explanation, we use a "social desirability" questionnaire measuring the subject's tendency to reply to expectations in a manner that will be viewed favorably by others (see Fischer and Fick, 1993) . We assume that if the motivational explanation is true, subjects with a stronger tendency of social desirability will more often decide for the bonus and invest higher levels of e¤ort (H3).
In contrast, the mechanism might be cognitive rather than motivational. Subjects might not be able to distance themselves cognitively from the default expectations suggested by the contract. They choose a bonus and invest more e¤ort, not because they want to please their contractual partner, but because they simply comply with the default. We use a cognitive re ‡ection (CRT) questionnaire measuring the tendency of our subjects to respond impulsively to cognitive tasks rather than after some re ‡ection (see Frederick, 2005) . Consistent with the cognitive explanation, we hypothesize (H4) that those subjects with a lower level of re ‡ection will more likely comply to the default and choose the bonus than those with higher level of re ‡ection.
The second mechanism besides the expectation communication e¤ect is (H5) that labeling a monetary amount "a bonus" and framing the compensation as an entity rather than a sum of separate payments transforms the stipulated payment into an endeared object (as opposed to just a monetary amount). 4 If this is true, the loss frame would induce an endowment e¤ect, which may lead to signi…cantly higher e¤ort levels through two distinct channels.
First, the endowment e¤ect may have a direct e¤ect on e¤ort, as the subject will try hard not to lose an endeared object. Assuming that there is a robust relationship between loss aversion and the endowment e¤ect, 5 we measure loss aversion and test whether those participants exhibiting higher loss aversion are more likely to choose a bonus or higher e¤ort levels than neutral subjects (H6). Finally, we may have also picked up an interaction e¤ect.
The endowment e¤ect may strengthen the expectation the loss frame communicates (H7).
If the gain frame makes achieving the bonus appear as a "reward", while the loss frame presents loosing the bonus as "punishment", a higher sense of endowment may lead to the perception of a stronger punishment: It means that an endeared object is taken from the subject if it does not meet expectations, rather than a mere sum of money.
Summarizing our results, we observe that a nontrivial fraction of subjects select e¤ort levels greater than the payo¤-maximizing choice. We also see more subjects choosing a bonus under the loss frame than under the gain frame (H1a) but this …nding would only be signi…cant at the 10% level. However, we …nd that individual subjects choose higher e¤ort levels signi…cantly more often under the loss frame than under the gain frame (supporting H1b).
Testing explanations for this framing e¤ect, we …nd that when suppressing the expectation default, subjects choose a signi…cantly lower e¤ort level (supporting H2). Supporting this …nding, subjects with a lower level of cognitive re ‡ection tend to more readily comply to the default expectation and therefore choose signi…cantly higher e¤ort levels (supporting H4). We do not …nd evidence for a motivational impact of the loss frame manipulation (no support for H3). Thus, we conclude that the default set by the loss frame in ‡uences subjects cognitively rather than motivational. Secondly, we …nd evidence for an endowment e¤ect, even though subjects do not have the bonus in their possession. When manipulating this label by calling the extra money neutrally a "payment" rather than a "bonus", and when scattered across a table.
5 Loss aversion and the endowment e¤ect are connected. For a long time loss aversion was even suggested to be the main explanation behind the endowment e¤ect (see Tverski and Kahneman, 1991). manipulating the perception of the bonus as an entity by presenting the amount in two …gures rather than in one, subjects choose the bonus signi…cantly less often and invest less e¤ort (supporting H5). Measuring the loss aversion of subjects, we also …nd strong evidence that the frequency with which loss averse and neutral subjects choose a bonus di¤ers significantly (supporting H6), providing additional evidence for our …nding that the endowment e¤ect is present. Finally, we were not able to …nd support for the interaction e¤ect between the endowment e¤ect and the expectation communication e¤ect (no support for H7).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our theoretical framework. Section 3 addresses our experimental design and procedure. Section 4 presents the main results of our experiment. Section 5 o¤ers extensions and further discussions.
Section 6 concludes.
The Framework
Our motivating assumption throughout is that contracts do more than describe terms of agreements. Verbal or written, contracts are speech acts (Austin 1955 , Searle 1969 ) having locutionary content, but also causing illocutionary and perlocutionary e¤ects. How one expresses or frames a contract, moreover, may in ‡uence the behavior of relevant parties in a manner independent of the agreement's legal interpretation, its pure economic implications and its social meanings. What we have in mind are well-known framing e¤ects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) .
Contracts, specifying merely a price and a quantity, are deceptively simple. Hidden behind these terms are implied clauses of quality as well as background damage and injunctive rules that may be invoked when quality falls short of what is required or when agreements are otherwise breached. Sophisticated parties, seeing through this thin veil, know there is more to their agreements. In fact, they often choose to make some of these implied clauses explicit and they do so in a variety of ways. As economists, we are tempted to treat contractswhether their terms are implied or expressed and however they are expressed-as equivalent when they lead to the same 'strict' incentive schemes. However, morality, fairness and behavioral e¤ects may be triggered in variable ways through otherwise incentive-equivalent schemes. We focus on the behavioral consequences of framing contracts in terms of gains or losses. A contract, or perhaps more precisely an accepted o¤er, presents itself to agents in a particular frame, which we de…ne in terms of the triple [p ( q) ; q; (q)] where p is price, q is a quantity/quality level as required under the contract, and (q) is the damage/bonus rule based on realized quantity which is either explicitly stipulated in the contract or implicit from the background legal or customary rules.
The contract we implement in our experiment only conditions on whether quantity/quality exceeds a threshold. In other words, while output can take di¤erent levels and could even be continuous, the contract only conditions on whether the produced output level v is higher than a threshold v. In order to formalize, let us de…ne the following index function:
Obviously we can construct two di¤erent types of contracts in this setting. Either the contract requires only low quantity/quality (v < v) and takes the form [p (0) ; 0; (q)] or it requires high quantity/quality (v v) and takes the form [p (1) ; 1; (q)]. We further specify the bonus/damage rule (q) as:
Bonus where b is the bonus level. It should be recognized that (q) 0 for q = 1 and (q) 0 for q = 0, which is why we refer to contract [p (0) ; 0; (q)] as the "gain frame" and to contract
[p (1) ; 1; (q)] as the loss frame. As we only want to study the framing e¤ect of contracts we further impose p (0) = p (1) b. This guarantees equivalence of the seller's payo¤ under the gain and loss frame:
Design and Procedure
We conducted our experiments during March and April of 2011 in the Labs of the University of Zurich and in the lab of ETH Zurich. Both labs share the same subject pool and recruiting mechanisms. 6 A total of 264 student subjects participated in the experiment, and were randomly assigned to one of our two main treatments (i.e., a gain frame or a loss frame) or one of two 2 follow-up treatments, which are labeled "loss expectation" and "loss endowment" (see Table 1 ). Subjects received a ‡at fee of 10 Swiss francs (about 11.5 USD) for showing up and earned an additional 11 to 18 Swiss francs conditional on their performance in the experiment. As noted above, our basic treatments compare e¤ort between a loss and a gain frame. In both treatments, subjects are told to imagine being a supplier who has contracted to produce and deliver circuit boards to a client. For our manipulation, we randomly assigned subjects to either the loss frame or the gain frame. In the gain frame, subjects are noti…ed that, in addition to a base price of p = 10; 000 CHF , 8 they will get a bonus of b = 2; 500 CHF if output exceeds v = 10; 000 circuit boards. In the loss frame, subjects are told that they get the same base price p and a provisional bonus of b, which will be retracted if output falls below threshold quantity v. Under both treatments, money was to be paid out after performance. So subjects did not hold the money in their hands in the loss treatment.
Machines had to be leased to ful…ll the contract. The subjects'task consisted of choosing the machine they wanted to lease. They could choose from among 6 machines, which di¤ered in price and performance (see Table 2 ). The higher the price, the lower the number of defective units and therefore the higher the output level. The relationship between the chosen machine and produced output was deterministic.
That is, by choosing a machine, subjects could perfectly control whether they produce suf…cient output to earn a bonus. They knew that by choosing machines 3, 4, 5 or 6 that they would earn a bonus of b = 2; 500 CHF since these machines all produced quantities that exceed v = 10; 000, whereas neither machine 1 or 2 possesses this production capacity so as to exceed v = 10; 000.
The payo¤ for the subjects could be calculated by taking the base price of 10; 000 plus a possible bonus of 2; 500 minus the cost of leasing a machine. The payo¤s were designed such that subjects could maximize their earnings by forgoing the bonus and leasing machine 1, the machine with the lowest output level. In other words, the marginal cost of leasing 8 The exchange rate from actual currency to experimental CHF was 1:500. the lowest-cost machine capable of generating a bonus (i.e., machine 3) exceeded the bonus payment (i.e., 2; 800 > 2; 500).
Basic Result
In H1, we hypothesized that subjects in the loss frame condition will choose the bonus more often (H1a), and that the tendency to lease higher output machines is signi…cantly stronger in the loss than in the gain frame (H1b). In other words, we hypothesize that the loss frame increases the e¤ort subjects invest. We begin our analysis by simply dichotomizing the data into whether or not the subjects chose an e¤ort level leading to a bonus. Testing the hypothesis that bonus-seeking is the same under both frames (using Fisher's exact test), we could not reject the presumption of equality at the 5% level (i.e., our 1-sided
Fisher's exact = 0.084). Even though the e¤ect is not signi…cant, we observe a clear trend that is close to our agreed signi…cance. Subjects in the loss frame seem to be more likely to choose the bonus.
So far we imagined that subjects would make e¢ cient choices, conditional on seeking a bonus or not. That is, we expected subjects to either forgo the bonus and choose e¤ort level 1 or go for the bonus and choose e¤ort level 3. Other than implicitly assuming that all other e¤ort levels would be equally rejected by the subjects, our framework made no prediction concerning the selection of e¤ort levels 2, 4, 5 or 6. But choosing the bonus is only the most obvious way to comply with expectations. Think of a workplace scenario. The company sets a threshold that workers are supposed to meet. However, the action space ususally will not be binary. Rather than merely choosing between meeting and not meeting expectations, workers can go beyond the expectation and invest even more e¤ort. The strongest way to fully comply with expectations is to overachieve them. Therefore instead of dichotomizing the data, we analyze the e¤ort level choices in the next step. We observe that under both the gain and loss frame a nontrivial number of subjects selected e¤ort levels that led to a bonus, despite the fact that expanding "e¤ort" to get the bonus was not a payo¤-maximizing strategy for the subjects. As Table 4 reveals, while 70% of the subjects selected the payo¤-maximizing technology (i.e., machine 1, or equivalently e¤ort level 1), all but 3 of the remaining subjects opted for a technology that leads to a bonus-most choosing the e¢ cient machine or e¤ort level, conditional on seeking a bonus (i.e.,e¤ort level 3).
In line with our hypothesis H1, Table 5 and the histograms in Figure 1 illustrate that higher e¤ort levels are chosen under the loss rather than under the gain frame. One-third more subjects (27 compared to 18) opted for a bonus-generating machine under the loss frame (H1a). Moreover, one-third of those 27 subjects receiving the bonus in the loss frame did so by selecting a more costly technology (i.e., machine 4) than was necessary if all they cared about was the bonus (H1b).
We test the statistical signi…cance of the observed di¤erences between the gain and loss frames. In a …rst step, we perform a Fisher test for independence in the contingency table.
We can reject the null hypothesis that the tables stem from the same distribution using a two tailed test with p=0.015 supporting the basic intution underlying H1 that the di¤erence between framing a contract as a gain and framing it as a loss matters.
We con…rm this result with a regression derived from the following simple equation,
where gainloss is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the gain frame and 0 for the loss frame, is a vector of coe¢ cients on e¤ort levels, (i.e., ef f ort i for i 2 f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g), and " is an error term.
The coe¢ cients,~ , are the fraction of subjects who choose e¤ort level i under the gain frame (and so 1 i is the fraction choosing e¤ort level i in the loss frame). If the gain and loss frames generated roughly comparable distributions of e¤ort levels, the coe¢ cients in Table 4 would approach 0.5, which appears to be the case for e¤ort levels 1 and 3. Yet a joint signi…cance test rejects at the 0.05 level the null that the coe¢ cients are equal. The result of this test, however, is largely driven by the coe¢ cient on e¤ort level 4, which when tested against the mean of gainloss was rejected at the 0.01 level. That is, the distributions under the gain and loss frames di¤er signi…cantly and e¤ort level 4 is the driver of this di¤erence.
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The Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test does not reject the null hypothesis that chosen e¤ort levels under the loss and gain frame have equal means (i.e., our one-tailed test returned a p-value of 0.064). The null hypothesis is, however, close to being rejected at the 5% level, and replacing the outlier who selected e¤ort level 5 under the gain treatment with the mean value of the gain treatment (e¤ort=1.57) leads to a signi…cant result of p= 0.49.
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The signi…cant results of the di¤erent test statistics strongly support H1. Still, the e¤ect might be small. To analyze the size of the e¤ect, we perform a regression with e¤ort being the dependent variable. Table 7 reports the coe¢ cients derived from the following regression formula.
ef f ort = (1 gainloss) + ": Again, conditional on there being a distortion away from the individually rational choice (the lower part of the table), we …nd with signi…cance that the loss frame induces higher levels of e¤ort. However, the R 2 suggests that the treatment dummy loss v. gain can not explain much of the observed variance suggesting that the treatment e¤ect is small. The treatment as an independent variable is not signi…cant on the 5% level (upper part of table 5). But if we replace the outlier choosing 5 in the gain frame with mean e¤ort -as we have done above for the U test -the R 2 slightly increases and the e¤ect turns to signi…cance (p=0.05).
The fact that the e¤ect is small is not surprising as we used a very parsimonious and transparent design. First, our setting was deterministic which implies that there was no room for loss aversion as expected payo¤s and realized payo¤s are the same. The absence of uncertainty is also likely to mute the expectation communication e¤ect -discussed in the following section -as defaults usually have a larger impact in an uncertain environment (see Altmann and Falk, 2008) . Nevertheless, in order to better isolate the di¤erent factors, we opted for the cleaner design.
Another reason why the size of the e¤ect may be small is that we used a control question to verify that every subject was able to calculate his individual payo¤. In order to stake the design against us, we let subjects calculate the payo¤ for machine 1. This might have contributed to the relative stickiness of choices of machine 1. The regression conditioning on choices for higher e¤ort levels than the minimum may suggest this interpretation. Of course, on the other hand the stickiness may simply be the consequence of machine 1 being the payo¤-maximizing decision.
Analyzing the Mechanism

Expectation Communication E¤ect
Hossain and List suggest that the endowment e¤ect is the sole driving factor behind the loss frame inducing greater e¤ort. However, in their …eld experiment, they were unable to directly test for this hypothesis. We proposed a di¤erent mechanism that may be driving greater e¤ort under the loss frame. We hypothesize that the loss frame may communicate a stronger sense of the default expectation of the party o¤ering the contract (H2). That is, separate from, and perhaps in addition to, loss aversion, another possible mechanism behind the selection of greater than individually rational e¤ort in the loss frame may be that the framing is a subtle way of communicating expectations of the party o¤ering the contract. In the gain frame the bonus may appear to be a "reward" while in the loss frame, taking it away seems like a "punishment"; as a result it may be that the subject thinks that expectations for meeting the threshold are higher under the loss frame than under the gain frame. After all, a reward is often viewed as a kind of recognition for voluntary high performance, while a punishment is more akin to a sanction for not meeting the client's expectations.
To test our hypothesis that the loss frame induces the default expectation that subjects should (at least) achieve the bonus, we ran an additional treatment, labeled "loss expectation" (See Tables 1 and 8 and Figure 2) . In this treatment, we informed subjects that the bonus is paid upfront merely for tax and accounting reasons. 11 The assumption was that by providing this alternative explanation for the framing of the contract, subjects would be less likely to perceive the loss frame as communicating a higher default expectation. We compare this expectation treatment with the original loss condition. We hypothesize (H2) that under the expectation treatment, subjects will choose lower e¤ort levels than in the original loss condition.
We perform a Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test, but it does not reject the null hypothesis that both treatments induce the same choice of e¤ort level at the 5 % level (p= 0.12 one tailed). Yet, Fisher's exact test, comparing the original loss treatment with the "loss expectation" treatment (i.e., the …rst and second column of …gures in table 6), returns a signi…cant result (p = 0.014), suggesting that the two columns are not realizations of the same distribution. 
Motivation vs Cognition
So far we have seen evidence that the loss frame increases the subject's e¤ort level. Directly manipulating the expectation e¤ect we found support for H2 that subjects comply with the default expectation of the company stronger in the loss frame. In this subsection, we want to disentangle whether the expectation communication e¤ect is motivational or cognitive. 
Motivation: Short Scale for Social Desirability
First, we want to analyze, whether a tendency for social desirability can explain the impact of the loss frame. It could be that subjects are motivated to please their client and therefore comply with the default expectation. In order to test this hypothesis, we measure subjects' tendency to reply to questions in a manner that will be viewed favorably by others. 14 We dichotomize the data. The half with the lower score was called the low type; the other half was classi…ed as the high type. 15 Here is the frequency table:
BeginExpansion
For analyzing the table, we used the Fisher Exact Test for independency in the contingency table. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two samples result from an independent distribution (p= 0.67). The questionaire results therefore do not support H3 that the loss frame has a motivational impact on e¤ort. While we cannot exclude that a motivational response towards framing has some impact in the real world, in our setting, its in ‡uence is certainly weak. The motivation to please the client or employer may be stronger if the relationship is based on more intensive and repeated personal contact than was present in our design which asked subjects to only imagine their contractual partner.
Cognition: Cognitive Re ‡ection Test
The second channel we analyze is cognition. Subjects might not be able to distance themselves cognitively from the default the contract suggests. We use a questionnaire that tests for cognitive re ‡ection (CRT) to measure the tendency of our subjects to respond impulsively to cognitive tasks rather than after some re ‡ection (see Frederick, 2005) . We hypothesize (H4) that those subjects with a lower level of cognitive re ‡ection will more likely comply to the default and choose the bonus. Prior research shows that participants, who score low on this test, comply more often with a default expectation, instead of questioning it (Altmann and Falk, 2008 , observe this result in the domain of default contributions to public goods).
Following Falk and Altmann, we assume that subjects with a lower CRT will more likely choose a higher e¤ort level than subjects with a high CRT. The score on this test is not re ‡ective of di¤erent degrees of understanding the experimental setup. We implemented a control question right after the introductory instructions. Subjects had to answer this question correctly before they were allowed to move on in the experiment. Rather we assume that participants with a lower CRT comply with the expectation of the company more readily; they question default expectations less often than the types with a higher CRT. We hypothesize that they do what the structure of the contract suggests: In the loss treatment, when the bonus is already assigned, achieving it seems to be the default (so subjects invest more to secure the bonus and overachieve beyond the default), while in the gain treatment, it remains conditional (so subjects feel that they meet expectations with just realizing the bonus or even without achieving it.)
The Cognitive Re ‡ection Task (CRT) questionnaire presents a set of three quiz questions to the subject. Subjects have a total of 90 seconds to answer all three questions. Here is one of the three questions: "A bat and a ball cost £ 1.10 in total. The bat costs £ 1 more than the ball. How many pence does the ball cost?" The answer that pops immediately to ones mind is ten pence. But on second thought, this result is obviously wrong. The questionnaire measures the ability of subjects, to question their …rst impulse and correct it. We assume that this ability predicts whether subjects will question the default the contract suggests and decide for their payo¤-maximizing choice on second thought.
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We dichotomized the data forming two player types, the high and the low re ‡ection type.
A subject answering either 0 or 1 question correctly was classi…ed as the low type, while a subject getting either 2 or 3 questions right was classi…ed as the high type. This classi…cation leads us to a nearly perfect median split between the two groups (54 vs. 59 subjects). Table   10 shows the frequencies. returns a signi…cant e¤ect (p= 0.038 one-tailed), rejecting the null hypothesis that high and low CRT types are choosing the same e¤ort levels. This result supports our H4 that low CRT types are more likely to choose higher e¤ort levels, when implied by the default structure of the contract. Our results suggest that the channel through which the loss frame increases the subjects'e¤ort investments is cognition rather than motivation.
This …nding also shields our result against a methodological concern. One might be concerned that our e¤ect is driven by an experimenter demand e¤ect (see John, 2008) .
Instead of implementing a game with interactive roles, we confronted subjects with a contract and asked them to imagine their contractual partner. The subjects might therefore aim their choices at the experimenter and decide to comply with his assumed expectations. But if this would have been the case here, our social desirability test should have shown some evidence for that. If the subjects wanted to please the experimenter instead of the …ctitious client in our setting, the high desirability type should have been more prone to the experimenter demand e¤ect than the low type and therefore we would …nd a signi…cant correlation between social desirability level and e¤ort choices.
Endowment E¤ect
Hossain and List (2009) assume loss aversion as the driving factor behind the e¤ect of framing. But we did not allow for any uncertainty in our setting. Also the "bonus" in our experiment is a monetary payment. The prior literature would suggest this monetary transfer does not induce an endowment e¤ect. 17 We suspect, however, that people may treat a "bonus" more as an object and therefore di¤erently from money per se. We assume that the endowment e¤ect builds on two elements. First, the e¤ect must relate to objects that are perceived as an entity. Think of loose pencils: If they are not bundled, subjects are unlikely to perceive the lot of them as an entity; but if bound together they are more 17 Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J., & Thaler, R. (1990) . Experimental Test of the endowment e¤ect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy 98(6), 1325-1348; Rebecca R. Boyce, et al., "An Experimental Examination of Intrinsic Values as a Source of the WTA-WTP Disparity,"American Economic Review, Vol. 82, No. 5 (Dec., 1992) , pp. 1366-1373 explores the idea of perceived intrinsic value of some goods.
likely to be seen as an entity (see Burson, 2011) . The second characteristic is that the entity must possess an element of endearment. Many experiments testing the endowment e¤ect are conducted with University mugs. If those mugs are replaced by ordinary ones, the e¤ect is at least weakened (see Boyce et al, 1992) . So adding an endearing quality to the object can induce the endowment e¤ect. We suggest that calling a payment "a bonus" leads to the two described e¤ects: 1) It changes the payment of money into an entity, which is to say, "a bonus!"; and 2) it creates an endearing object, since the term "bonus" carries the connotation of appreciation.
We compare the basic loss treatment with a new condition in which we eliminate these two e¤ects. First, we suppressed the endearing e¤ect of the bonus (i.e., as a positively connoted object) by removing the word "bonus"; second, we sought to transform the sum of money from a single entity by indicating the payment amount as a summation of two simple …gures. Speci…cally, we characterize the extra amount of money by splitting up the 2,500 CHF into 1,200 CHF and 1,300 CHF. The distribution of e¤ort under this adjusted loss treatment, which we label "Loss Endowment," is reported in Table 8 , in the third column.
We test the hypothesis (H5) that labeling a monetary amount a "bonus" and framing the compensation as an entity induces an endowment e¤ect that is triggered in the loss frame. Table 8 reveals that only one subject chose an e¤ort level of 6, which is an outlier. Using the Mann-Whitney, we test (H5) whether e¤ort levels under the original loss frame condition are higher than under the new endowment treatment (i.e., the …rst and third columns of …gures in Table 6 ). We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the e¤ort level choices of subjects in the two treatments result from the same distribution with the test returning a p-value of p = 0.063. However, replacing the identi…ed outlier with the median choice of the treatment, we get signi…cance at the 5% level (i.e., p = 0.041), supporting our hypothesis (H5) that labeling the payment as a bonus induces an endowment e¤ect that increases e¤ort.
Test for Loss Aversion & Endowment E¤ect
Loss aversion and the endowment e¤ect are connected. For a long time, loss aversion was suggested to be the main explanation behind the endowment e¤ect (see Tverski and Kahneman, 1991) . Even though that di¤erent explanations have been brought up since (see Glöckner et al., 2009) , the relationship remains: Subjects who are strongly loss averse are also prone to display an intensive endowment e¤ect. We thus assume that those subjects who are more loss averse are also more likely to choose higher e¤ort levels in our experiment.
To …nd additional support for our …nding that the endowment e¤ect increases subjects e¤ort investments under the loss treatment, we test our subjects for loss aversion. 18 We hypothesize (H6) that those participants, who are strongly loss averse are more likely to choose a higher level of e¤ort.
Testing for loss aversion, we present subjects the opportunity to participate in two lotteries. The second lottery repeats the …rst one for six times using the same payo¤s. Both lotteries are designed such that a non-loss averse subject should choose to participate. Still, subjects can lose parts of their earnings, even though in expectation, participation in the lottery yields a gain. Subjects might reject the …rst lottery, but accept the second. Since the lottery is repeated six times, the likelihood of making a loss is reduced. So slightly loss averse subjects might reject the …rst but accept the second repeated lottery. Here is the lottery: "If you participate in this lottery you win 8 CHF with a probability of 1 2 and you loose 5 CHF with a probability of 1 2
."
For our analysis, we formed two player types: the loss averse and the neutral type.
If a player chose to participate in both lotteries, we classi…ed her as the neutral type; if she rejected either the …rst or the second lottery, we treated her as loss averse. 19 This classi…cation gave us a nearly perfect median split of subjects. We hypothesize (H6) that signi…cantly more subjects who are the strong loss averse type will choose the bonus than subjects who are the neutral type. We included all sessions of the loss treatments (including those of the expectation and the endowment condition) in the analysis. In a …rst step, we dichotomized the data treating all decisions choosing an e¤ort level that did not lead to the bonus (e¤ort levels 1 and 2) as 1 and all choices that realized the bonus (e¤ort levels 3, 4, 5and 6) as 2. With this data set, we performed a Wilcoxon (Mann Whitney) test and rejected the null that both types choose the bonus equally often (p =0.001). We performed the same analysis with the dichotomous data of bonus choices. Again, we reject the null that the loss averse type chooses the bonus as frequently as the neutral type (p = 0.013).
We thus …nd strong evidence that using a bonus concept in contract design transforms the stipulated payment into an endeared object. If the contract is framed such that it puts subjects in a loss scenario, it induces an endowment e¤ect leading to signi…cantly higher e¤ort level choices.
We did not test the mechanism behind this result in detail, since we were mainly interested in the behavioral response of participants, but we identi…ed two separate factors in understanding the impact of the endowment e¤ect: Labeling the extra payment as the endeared object "bonus" and presenting it as an entity rather than a faceless sum of money.
Finally, we hypothesize (H7) that the endowment e¤ect may a¤ect the subject's choice of e¤ort by strengthening the default expectation. As noted earlier, subjects think expectations are higher for meeting the threshold in the loss frame than in the gain frame because in the gain frame, the bonus appears to be a "reward" while in the loss frame, taking the bonus away seems like a "punishment."Under this theory, as a stronger sense of endowment leads to higher perceived punishment, the endowment e¤ect may indirectly increase e¤ort.
We performed a linear regression with e¤ort as the dependent variable and the dummy variables "Treatment", "CRT" and "Loss Aversion type" as the independent variables. We did not …nd any evidence for an interaction e¤ect between the variables Loss Aversion and the CRT type. We thus conclude that at least in our setting, we were not able to show that the endowment e¤ect sharpens the perception of punishment in the loss frame and thus leads subjects to invest a higher level of e¤ort.
Conclusion
Recent evidence from a …eld experiment by Hossain and List (2009) suggest that framing contracts in a manner that makes 'losses" more salient than "gains" leads to greater e¤ort.
However, the mechanism through which greater e¤ort is induced through the loss frame, at least over some range, is not well documented. We investigated two explanations for this framing e¤ect in a laboratory setting. First, we assume that the loss frame communicates the expectation that achieving the bonus is the default and that our subjects comply to this expectation. Defusing the expectation default in a control treatment, we …nd that subjects choose lower e¤ort levels. Supporting this result, subjects with a lower level of cognitive re ‡ection tend to choose signi…cantly higher e¤ort levels more readily complying to the default expectation. We do not …nd evidence for a motivational impact. Whether subjects score high or low on a social desirability scale we presented to subjects does not predict whether subjects are more likely to choose higher e¤ort levels.We conclude that the default in ‡uences subjects cognitively rather than motivational. Moreover, we …nd evidence for an endowment e¤ect, even though the bonus is just a monetary payment that subjects do not even have in their possession. We …nd that manipulating the label and entitative nature of "the bonus" has a signi…cant e¤ect on e¤ort. Our results suggest that the loss frame in ‡uences subjects' e¤ort choices through two distinct channels: by an endowment e¤ect and by setting a default expectation that cognitively induces subjects to invest more e¤ort.
